Maine Workers’ Compensation Board Approves New § 312 Candidates

In a unanimous vote, the Maine Workers’ Compensation Board recently approved Dr. Benjamin Branch, a physiatrist, and Dr. Howard Glass, a cardiologist, as independent medical examiners (IMEs) pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. §312 of the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Section 312 IMEs render medical findings on the medical condition of an employee and related issues. The IME in a case may not be the employee’s treating healthcare provider and may not have treated the employee with respect to the injury for which the claim is being made or for which the benefits are being paid. Unless agreed upon by the parties, or no other physician is reasonably available, a physician is not eligible to be assigned as an IME if the physician has examined the employee at the request of an insurance company, employer, or employee in accordance with section 207 (an employer/insurer-requested medical examination) or has been closely affiliated with the insurance company at any time during the previous 52 weeks. 

The opinions of IMEs are afforded great weight. Under the Maine Workers Compensation Act, “[t]he board shall adopt the medical findings of the [IME] unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary in the record that does not support the medical findings.” The Maine Supreme Court has interpreted the “clear and convincing evidence to the contrary” standard to require a showing “that it is highly probable that the record did not support the [IME’s] findings.” Dubois v. Madison Paper, Co., 2002 ME 1. The Court in Dubois described the standard as follows:

The party with the burden of persuasion may prevail only if he can place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of his factual contentions are highly probable.

Id. at ¶ 10 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

The Board maintains a list of approved examiners, which, at the present time, includes the following specialties: chiropractic, internal medicine, family medicine, orthopedics, osteopathy, physiatry, podiatry, psychology, psychiatry, neurology, and pulmonology.

Appellate Division Finds Amendment to Current Maine Workers’ Compensation Act Can Toll Statute of Limitations Under the Former Act with In-House Medical Treatment

In Davis v. Boise Cascade, WCB App. Div. No. 17-41 (December 1, 2017), the Appellate Division weighed in on a case involving in-house medical treatment and tolling of the statute of limitations under the former and current Maine Workers’ Compensation Act.

The statute of limitations for injuries prior to January 1, 1993 (39 MRSA § 95), does not contain a provision tolling the time for filing claims in the event that in-house medical care was provided by an employer for a work injury. Effective January 1, 1993, as part of the enactment of the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992, a new statute of limitations was passed (39-A MRSA § 306). The new version of Title 39-A has a transition section stating that § 306 applies only to injuries on or after January 1, 1993, while dates of injury prior to that date were controlled by the analogous former Title 39. But in 2001, the Legislature amended § 306 to add a new paragraph (A) to subsection (2), tolling the statute of limitations when an injured worker received medical care from the employer’s in-house medical staff. Of note, the application provision of the 2001 amendment states that it “applies to all injuries and illnesses, regardless of when they occurred.”

The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the 2001 amendment to § 306 applies to the 1989 and 1990 injuries and that the medical treatment provided by NewPage’s in-house medical department had tolled the statute of limitation against Boise Cascade.

The issue on appeal was whether the 2001 amendment to § 306 applies to claims governed by 39 MRSA § 95 so as to alter what constitutes a payment of benefits for those claims and, if so, whether the ALJ properly applied that amendment to this case.

The employee worked at the Rumford paper mill from 1981 to 2014. During this time, the mill changed ownership from Boise Cascade to NewPage Corporation; Sedgwick acted as workers’ compensation claims manager for both. The employee sustained two work injuries while Boise Cascade owned the mill—in 1989 and 1990. He received partial incapacity benefits until July 22, 2004, when he began earning more than his pre-injury average weekly wage. The last payment of benefits that relates to the 1989 and 1990 injuries was made on July 22, 2004.

While weekly incapacity benefits had stopped, the employee’s neck continued to be symptomatic. He went to the mill’s medical department for neck-related treatment, including a visit on December 4, 2007. The employee’s low back condition continued to bother him. He periodically sought treatment for that condition at the mill’s medical department, including on April 30, 2009.

In 2010, after NewPage took over the mill, the employee sustained two more injuries: a March 3, 2010, right hand injury, and an August 11, 2010 low back aggravation. The employee also communicated his low back problems to Sedgwick, NewPage’s claims administrator. His discussion included mention of the August 2010 incident and a “1990ish” injury. Sedgwick paid the employee medical benefits but recorded its payments as relating to the August 2010 injury, not the 1990 injury.

In August and September 2014, the employee filed petitions seeking incapacity from Boise Cascade and NewPage for his four injuries and payment of medical bills. NewPage filed a Petition for Apportionment seeking contribution against Boise Cascade regarding the 1990 low back injury. Boise Cascade filed a Petition Seeking to Establish a Date of Maximum Medical Improvement on the 1989 and 1990 injuries and asserted statute of limitations defense on both of those injuries.

The Appellate Division found the ALJ’s interpretation of the amendment adding paragraph 306(2)(A) as applying to all injuries regardless of when they occurred was a reasonable construction and involved no misconception of applicable law.

The Appellate Division also rejected the employer’s argument that the ALJ’s interpretation is an unconstitutional retroactive application of § 306(2)(A). The Appellate Division found that, unlike amendments that shorten an existing statute of limitations, those that extend it are not “retroactive” if they: (1) do not change the legal consequences of acts or events that precede the effective date of amendment, and (2) the claims have not yet been barred by the previous statute of limitations. See Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, 4 16 A. 2d 814 (Me. 1980). Here, findings § 306(2)(A) extends the limitations period in 95, which does not change the legal consequences of acts that precede the effective date of an amendment, only those after it. In this case, the employee’s receipt of in-house medical treatment after July 22, 2004, took place after the 2001 amendment. Up to that time, the statute of limitations on the 1989 and 1990 injuries had not expired. Moreover, even if the amendment to § 95 were retroactive legislation, it would only be unconstitutional if “its implementation impairs vested rights or imposes liabilities that would result from conducted predating the legislation.” Merrill v. Eastland Woolen Mills, Inc., 430 A.2d 557 (Me. 1981). A retroactive extension of Title 39’s limitation period would not impair a vested right because “[n]o one has a vested right in the running of a statute of limitations until the prescribed time has completely run and barred the action.” Dobson, 415 A.2d at 816.

Judge Hirtle dissented, finding that the 2001 amendments to § 306 do not apply to the 1989 and 1990 injuries, and would accordingly find the claim for the 1989 injury barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Hirtle points out that the scope of Title 39-A, including 306, is found in sec A-10 of the Workers’ Compensation Act of 1993. Section A-10 provides, “[s]o as not to alter benefits for injuries incurred before January 1, 1993[,]” 306 does not apply to injuries prior to January 1, 1993, and the “applicable provisions of former Title 39 apply in place of Title 39-A” for injuries that occurred prior to January 1, 1993. According to Judge Hirtle, to interpret the 2001 amendments to 306 as altering the statute of limitations in 95 is inconsistent with the plain language of section A-10. Judge Hirtle finds the majority’s interpretation transforms the 2011 amendment of 306 into an amendment of 95, even though the Legislature expressly stated that those two sections have a separate and distinct application.

This case provides an interesting example of certain narrow circumstances where provisions of the new Act (Title 39-A) apply to pre-1993 dates of injury. Despite the fact that the transition section of Title 39-A provides that § 306 only applies to injuries on or after January 1, 1993, the Appellate Division apparently chose to give more weight to the 2001 amendment (§ 306(2)(A)), which provides that § 306 “applies to all injuries and illnesses, regardless of when they occurred.”

Workers’ Compensation Board Rules Taskforce Proposes Changes to Workers’ Compensation Board Rules

The Workers’ Compensation Board Rules Taskforce has proposed changes and amendments to various Board Rules. The following are highlights of what has been proposed. 

WCB Rules c. 1 may be amended to provide that if an employer is out of business, has been sold, or changed its name since the last time the employee worked there, an employee’s failure to give notice of the injury does not bar a claim unless the employer designated a person or entity to receive notice and the employee was provided with that designation in writing.

There is a proposed amendment to WCB Rules 4 §4(1), which currently provides that the cost for a 312 IME is borne “by the employer.” Under the proposed rule, the fee for the examination and report would be borne by the employer/insurer that requested the exam and any other employer/insurer that is a party to the proceeding. If an employee requests the exam, all employers/insurers that are parties shall, unless otherwise agreed, split the cost equally. 

A proposed amendment to Chapter 5 would provide for a procedure to expeditiously go before an administrative law judge (ALJ) if a medical release is revoked and there is a compensation payment scheme in place. 

There are numerous proposed amendments to WCB Rules c. 6, the vocational rehabilitation rule. Proposals would establish minimum qualifications for employment rehabilitation providers and provide for two-year appointments. The proposed rule would provide that providers must clearly articulate why or why not an employee is suitable for vocational rehabilitation and, if eligible, provide a detailed employment rehabilitation plan, including a clear plan for workforce reentry, outline of expected costs, and estimated length of the plan. There are also proposed rules dealing with plan implementation procedures and conflicts of interest. Objections to proposed plans would be forwarded to an ALJ for review. Proposed amendments also provide that an employment rehabilitation plan may end if the provider states that services have been completed; the duration allowed under §217(5) has expired; the applicant is unwilling or unable to continue, or is otherwise uncooperative; the parties agree to end the plan; a hearing officer or ALJ orders the plan to end; or the workers’ compensation claim lump sum settles. Finally, with respect to § 355(7) which provides that, “upon an order of recovery of plan implementation costs under section 217, subsection 3, the board shall assess the employer who refused to agree to implement the plan under section 217 an amount equal to 180% of the costs paid from the fund under this subsection,” a proposed amendment provides that an employer/insurer could file a petition objecting to an order of payment of costs where an employee returns to suitable employment after completing a rehabilitation plan to which the employer/insurer did not agree to pay.

A proposed amendement to WCB c. 8, § 18 would provide that the Consent Between Employer and Employee (WCB‑4A) may be used when the parties have agreed to discontinue or reduce benefits during the 21-day period following the filing of a Certificate of Discontinuance or Reduction of Compensation (WCB-8). By background, currently a WCB‑4A may be used when the parties have agreed to a voluntary payment of a retroactive closed-end period of incapacity, or a modification, reduction, or discontinuance in ongoing weekly incapacity benefits. 

There are various proposed amendments to WCB Rules c. 12, which primarily relate to hearing procedures. This includes revised questions on the exchange of information forms, minor changes in procedures regarding exhibits, and for continuances of hearings. There is also a proposed provision which would expressly provide that a party is not prohibited from seeking a prospective order for payment of medical treatment if payment for that treatment or treatments, or related expenses, has been denied by the opposing party.

Sporadic Lost Time, the Seven Day Waiting Period, and Rule 1.1

The Maine Workers’ Compensation Board recently addressed a case involving the time for payment of benefits, the statutory waiting period and the application of Rule 1.1, emphasizing the need to pay close attention to broken periods of lost time.

39-A MRSA § 205(2) provides:

2. Time for payment. The first payment of compensation for incapacity under section 212 or 213 is due and payable within 14 days after the employer has notice or knowledge of the injury or death, on which date all compensation then accrued must be paid. Subsequent incapacity payments must be made weekly and in a timely fashion. . . .

39-A MRSA § 204 imposes a seven-day waiting period before incapacity benefits are payable: 

§204. Waiting period; when compensation payable
Compensation for incapacity to work is not payable for the first seven days of incapacity, except that firefighters must receive compensation from the date of incapacity. In case incapacity continues for more than fourteen days, compensation is allowed from the date of incapacity.

The so-called “fourteen-day rule," per WCB Rule, c. 1 § 1, provides: 

§ 1. Claims for Incapacity and Death Benefits  

1. Within fourteen days of notice or knowledge of a claim for incapacity or death benefits for a work-related injury, the employer or insurer will:

A. Accept the claim and file a Memorandum of Payment checking "Accepted"; or
B. Pay without prejudice and file a Memorandum of Payment checking "Voluntary Payment Pending Investigation"; or
C. Deny the claim and file a Notice of Controversy.

For cases where the employee does not lose consecutive days from work, the methodology recommended by the Workers’ Compensation Board’s Monitoring Audit and Enforcement Unit is to file a Memorandum of Payment (MOP) or Notice of Controversy (NOC) “on the sixth day after ‘day 8.’” In other words, once an employee has missed eight nonconsecutive days of work, a MOP or NOC should be filed with the Board on the sixth day thereafter.

In Bendtson v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center, WCB No.: 16-004591 (October 18, 2017), the Employee in Bendtson worked as a certified nursing assistant (CNA). She was hurt lifting a resident on March 1, 2016. She was provided with a transitional work assignment from March 1, 2016, to April 1, 2016. She called out before her scheduled shift on March 1 as she claimed she was in too much pain to work. She called out again before her next scheduled shift on March 4, 2016. On March 8, 2016, she was assessed with modified work capacity. Over the next two weeks, she worked several light-duty shifts but also called out twice due to her back. On March 22, 2016, the employee checked herself into a facility for unrelated treatment, but was discharged March 28, 2016. On that date, she told her Employer that she was unable to work on account of neck/upper back pain.

In sum, the employee called out or was taken out of work by a medical provider on seven nonconsecutive days (March 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, and 18). The NOC was required to be filed six days after “day 8.” In this case, “day 8” did not occur until after March 28. The administrative law judge (ALJ) noted, “whether there was a fourteen-day violation depends on how much time [the Employee] was out of work due to her work injury, whether this exceeded the statutory seven-day waiting period, and when the Employer had ‘notice or knowledge of a claim for incapacity.’”

The Board found that the filing of a NOC on April 1 (well within fourteen days of March 28) was timely.

The Board also reminded us that the event which triggers an employer’s obligation to act (under Rule 1.1) is its notice or knowledge of a “claim for incapacity or death benefits for a work-related injury.” An employer’s knowledge of lost time is insufficient to trigger the rule—the employer must have knowledge of a claim for incapacity benefits. The ALJ found it significant that the Employer had notice of the claimed injury and that the Employee had lost several days of work but that this did not constitute knowledge of a “claim for incapacity benefits” which triggered an employer’s obligation to file a NOC. Because the seven-day waiting period had not yet expired, the Employer had no obligation to pay benefits. The Employer would not have been able to file a MOP, either accepting the claim or as a voluntary payment without prejudice, because it was not yet obligated to make any payment. Therefore, two of the three actions that an employer must choose under Rule 1.1 were unavailable to the Employer until March 28, 2016, when the employee told the Employer she was unable to work due to neck and upper back pain.

Ultimately, because the employee’s sporadic days out of work did not exceed the seven-day waiting period until March 28, 2016, and because the Employer had no notice or knowledge of a claim for incapacity until then, the filing of a NOC on April 1, 2016, was timely and there was no fourteen-day violation.

Appellate Division Revisits Res Judicata and Permanent Impairment in the Wake of Bailey v. City Of Lewiston

In Somers v. S.D. Warren Co., WCB App. Div. No. 17-38 (November 13, 2017), the Employee appealed a decision granting S.D. Warren’s Petition for Review and request to discontinue payments due to the expiration of the 520-week durational limit on incapacity benefits.

In a 2008 decree, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found the Employee’s knee condition resulted in 7% whole-body permanent impairment. The ALJ specifically declined to award any permanent impairment for the Employee’s adjustment disorder, a psychological sequela of the knee injury because, according to the § 312 Independent Medical Examiner, she did not sustain any permanent impairment due to that condition.

Litigation was commenced when S.D. Warren filed a Petition for Review seeking to terminate benefits based on the 520-week durational limit (under § 213 of the Maine Workers' Compensation Act, compensation for partial incapacity is payable for a maximum of 520 weeks, except in cases where an employee’s whole-person permanent impairment exceeds a given percentage [set by the Board]). On the other hand, the Employee argued that a “change in circumstances” since the prior decree—a worsening in her right knee and psychological conditions—justified reevaluation of her permanent impairment rating.

The ALJ found the Employee failed to establish a medical change in circumstances sufficient to overcome the res judicata effect of the 2008 decree. Thus, the ALJ found the impairment rating remained at 7%. The Employee filed a Motion for Further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In response, the ALJ did not alter the outcome, but issued an amended decree finding that any change in the Employee’s psychological condition was a change in degree, rather than kind.

On appeal, the Employee argued that the ALJ erred in finding that she failed to prove a change in circumstances necessary to overcome the res judicata effect of a 2008 decision establishing permanent impairment (valid decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Board are subject to the rules of res judicata and are no longer subject to collateral attack after they become final. This point becomes particularly important, as explained below).

Before a decision was issued, the Law Court issued its decision in Bailey v. City of Lewiston, 2017 ME 160. In Bailey, the Law Court has held that permanent impairment and maximum medical improvement are not subject to reconsideration, even in the face of changed medical circumstances. The Appellate Division offered its interpretation of a seemingly unclear point in the wake of Bailey. Namely, exactly what happens when an employee seeks to increase permanent impairment after a decree establishing permanency. To be clear, Bailey addressed whether a downward revision of permanent impairment was possible. The Employee argued that the Bailey decision should be limited in its application to that set of facts. The Appellate Division disagreed:

"We disagree with this contention. The issue in Bailey, as framed by the Court, was whether the Workers’ Compensation Act allows the Board to revise a previously established impairment rating. It answered that question in the negative without distinguishing between upward and downward revisions. Therefore, pursuant to Bailey, the ALJ did not err when declining to revise the 7% impairment rating assigned to [the Employee’s] knee in the 2008 decree."

The Employee also argued that the Board should have increased her whole body impairment rating to account for added impairment related to her psychological sequela. However, in 2008 the ALJ had essentially found 0% psychological impairment and that figure cannot now be adjusted upward based on changed circumstances. 

The ALJ granted S.D. Warren’s Petition for Review and allowed it to cease paying partial incapacity benefits. 

Time will tell whether the case is appealed to the Law Court.

Maine Supreme Court to Address "Tolling"of Statute of Limitations in Successive Injury Case

On November 14, 2017, the Maine Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the case of Flanagin v. Maine Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife. This case deals with the concept of “tolling” of the statute of limitations. Under Maine law, “the limitations period for a claim is tolled if payments made by the employer or insurer or a subsequent injury were made with ‘contemporaneous notice’ that the payments ‘were for treatment that was in part necessitated by’ the earlier injury.” Leighton v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 111. The “contemporaneous notice” issue arises from a concern that an employer may not have exclusive control, through its claim handling practices, over the assignment of dates of injury to a claim that may eventually have an impact upon the tolling or application of the statute of limitations in successive injury cases. 

Leighton held that an employer bears the burden of establishing the date of latest payment for the original injury, “but that the burden shifts to the employee to establish that the statute of limitations has been tolled through contemporaneous notice.” As the Appellate Division stated, “[i]t is through this explicit burden-shifting mechanism that an employer’s exclusive ability to assign incapacity or medical payments to a date of injury can be questioned and tested.” In Leighton, the Law Court noted that an employee could satisfy this burden by:

for example, submitting medical records that attribute the onset of new symptoms at least in part to the prior injury, along with evidence that the insurer or employer had been made aware of the contents of the records at the time payments were made. Or, the employee could submit proof that he or she had asserted a belief to the employer at the time payments were being made that the older injury is at least in part responsible for the later incapacity.

Turning to the facts of Flanagin, on July 31, 2014, the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Board found the employee entitled to workers’ compensation benefits on account of an injury sustained in 1975 while working for the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (the “Department”). It rejected the Department’s contention that the ALJ erred in finding it had “contemporaneous notice” within the limitations period sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on a 1975 injury. The Appellate Division found the Department had contemporaneous notice within the 10-year statute of limitations and that payments made on a 1979 injury were related to a 1975 injury.

The Appellate Division found that the Law Court cases, taken together, “endorse as sufficient a relatively low threshold to meet the employee’s burden to establish the causative relationship.” Therefore, “the employee must show that the earlier injury ‘contributed in some part’ to the later incapacity or need for medical treatment, or that medical treatment after the later injury was ‘in part necessitated by’ the earlier injury. An employee may also, alternatively, demonstrate that he or she informed the employer that the earlier injury was still in play at the time of the payments. This is not the same standard as may be required to establish medical causation in a contested workers’ compensation claim. Instead, it is a “somewhat lower ‘connection’ standard that is unique to the circumstances inherent in determining whether the employer’s unilateral assignment of dates of injury in successive injury cases is, or is not, correct.”

With respect to the 1975 injury at issue, the Appellate Division found “the [ALJ] raised the legal bar to a height not required by [Law Court precedent.]” According to the Appellate Division, a 1989 report conveyed the necessary information to the Department to meet the employee’s burden with respect to the 1975 injury and was sufficient to establish contemporaneous notice as a matter of law. As the Appellate Division pointed out, the 1989 report did “more than merely recite the history of [the employee’s] low-back problems, but it indicates that the employee reported to the physician in 1989 that the 1975 injury was his “major back injury” and that he still had the same complaints of low-back pain and left leg pain in 1989 that he had in 1975.

In other words, the doctor’s clinical examination demonstrated that the then-current diagnosis of chronic low-back pain started with the 1975 injury and remained unchanged over the years despite two surgical procedures. The Appellate Division found this was “sufficient to establish a ‘partial attribution’ or contribution in part of the 1975 injury to then-current symptomology.” As well, the report also sufficiently demonstrated that the later-in-time treatment was partially necessitated by the earlier injury. In addition, the Appellate Division also found that the 1989 report satisfied the alternative manner of providing contemporaneous notice: assertion of a belief by the employee at the time payments were being made and within the 10-year window that the older injury was in part responsible for the later incapacity and treatment.

On remand, the ALJ found the employee had proven that the Department had been put on notice that medical treatment for a 1979 work injury implicated the 1975 injury.

The Department appealed to the Law Court, arguing that the Appellate Division erred by determining that there was a tolling of the applicable statute of limitations and upholding an award of benefits that includes incapacity for a date of injury barred by the statute of limitations.

This is one of several workers’ compensation cases the Law Court has accepted for appellate review this year.

Appellate Division to Revisit (for a Second Time) the Issue of Refusal of Suitable Work in St. Louis V. Acadia Hospital

In St. Louis v. Acadia Hospital Corp., WCB No. 10002460 (April 14, 2017), the Maine Workers’ Compensation Board issued a decision dated March 4, 2015, finding the Employee had not refused an offer of suitable work and awarded partial incapacity benefits reduced by an imputed earning capacity of $300.00/week. The Employer appealed to the Appellate Division. A decision issued January 12, 2017, St. Louis v. Acadia Hospital Corp., App. Div. 17-3 (January 12, 2017), ordered that the case be remanded for a more complete analysis of whether the Employee unreasonably refused a bona fide offer of reasonable employment within the meaning of 39-A M.R.S.A. § 214(1)(A). 

The Employee worked as a certified nursing assistant (CNA) at Acadia Hospital. She was injured January 29, 2010. On account of this injury, the Employee experiences post-concussive headaches and an anxiety disorder with features of post-traumatic stress disorder. Because of her symptoms, she stopped working for the Employer August 6, 2013. She began a work search in February 2014 and found a part-time cashier position beginning February 10, 2014. The Employer sent the Employee a job offer on February 6, 2014, offering full-time work as a telephone operator and receptionist with a provision that the Employee would not be working in a patient care area or asked to be involved in restraining patients. This position paid approximately $12.00 per hour, while her position as a cashier paid $8.00 per hour. The Employee declined the offer because she had already accepted a new job as a cashier. The Employee testified that she was also concerned that, despite assurances, she still may have contact with patients through incidental activities like eating lunch. The Employer presented testimony from a human resources representative that the position offered was in a secured area inaccessible to patients and that the Employee was not required to take breaks or eat meals in areas with patients.

The Employee saw Drs. Carlyle Voss and Karyn Woelflein for independent medical examinations (39-A M.R.S.A. § 312). Dr. Voss found she, “could manage the basic duties of [a telephone] operator” and “could do similar work in another setting where there is low risk for being assaulted[,]” but “would be at significant risk to have symptoms escalate which could cause impairment that would preclude any type of work if she returned to work at Acadia or in another setting where there is increased risk for assaults.” Dr. Woelflein stated, “it would be imprudent for [her] to return to work at Acadia.”

The Employee argued that her refusal of the job offer was reasonable because she had already found work within her restrictions at a new employer and that the offered position was beyond her medical limitations. The Employer argued that the offer was reasonable as it was made only a few days after she began working for a new employer, paid higher, and was within her medical limitations. The Employer argued that § 214(1)(A) barred an award of partial incapacity benefits.

On the issue of refusal of suitable work, the Employer bears the burden of persuasion. In general, if an injured worker “receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment” and the employee “refuses that employment without good and reasonable cause,” that employee is barred from receiving incapacity benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act “during the period of the refusal.” 39-A M.R.S.A. § 214(1)(A). The term, “reasonable employment” means “any work that is within the employee's capacity to perform that poses no clear and proximate threat to the employee's health and safety and that is within a reasonable distance from that employee's residence.” 39-A M.R.S.A. § 214(5).

When applying § 214, an administrative law judge (ALJ) “is required to undertake a two-part analysis, reviewing both the employer's actions in making the job offer and the employee's actions in declining that offer.” Thompson v. Claw Island Foods, Inc., 1998 ME 101, ¶ 7. When evaluating an employee's decision to decline a job offer, an ALJ must determine first whether the offer was a “bona fide offer of reasonable employment.” Id. The factors to consider include “whether the work falls within the employee's work capacity, whether it poses a threat to the employee's health and safety, and whether it is within a reasonable distance of the employee's residence.” Id. ¶ 8. Second, an ALJ must determine whether the employee refused that offer without “good and reasonable cause.” Id. ¶ 16. The reasonableness of the refusal is a broad inquiry; an ALJ “must consider all facts relevant to the employee's decision to decline the job offer.” Id. The Law Court has provided some guidance to this inquiry with a five factor test that is “not intended to be exhaustive or conclusive” but “represent[s] a sound general framework for decision making when the employee has refused an offer of reasonable employment:” (1) the timing of the offer, (2) if the employee has moved, the reasons for moving, (3) the diligence of the employee in trying to return to work, (4) whether the employee has actually returned to work with some other employer and, (5) whether the effort, risk, sacrifice or expense is such that a reasonable person would not accept the offer. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19. 

Among other things, the ALJ found the position offered pays significantly higher than the work the Employee found on her own, but would have required her to abandon the cashier's position shortly after committing to it. Further, the ALJ found significant the medical opinions of Dr. Voss and Dr. Woelflein, which bear on her ability to return to work for the Employer. The ALJ found the Employer had not met its burden to prove that the Employee refused the offered job without good and reasonable cause. The Board granted the Employee’s Petitions for Award, in part, with an ongoing award of partial incapacity benefits reduced by an imputed earning capacity of $300.00/week. The matter is on appeal once again before the Appellate Division. 

Refusal of suitable work has generated a lot of decisions from the Appellate Division to date. This is due to the very fact-specific nature of these cases, particularly when it comes to the multifactor tests used in assessing a refusal defense. In this case, the binding medical evidence and the fact that the employee had already secured work before the offer was made were significant factors for the ALJ.